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This article assesses the relative burden European members of NATO are bearing
in the war in Afghanistan. Some argue that the current contribution of European
forces is on par with the American contribution. However, current studies do not
analyze Europe’s ISAF contribution in comparison to some benchmark by which
relative burden-sharing can be accurately determined. This article compares
Europe’s involvement in the war in Afghanistan to past missions, current
contributions and in light of the benefits each country is likely to enjoy. The
quantitative and qualitative findings show that there is an extensive amount of
free-riding occurring both in terms of hard and soft power, although it varies
across time and even within NATO Europe. Inadequate forces provided by
European NATO countries jeopardize the likelihood of success in Afghanistan.
Keywords: NATO; Afghanistan; burden-sharing
1. Introduction
President Obama recently announced in early December that he would escalate the US
commitment to the war in Afghanistan by increasing the number of American troops
in Afghanistan by over 30,000 to a total of 100,000 by the end of 2010. There were
hopes that other NATO countries will match this contribution by increasing their
share of the burden within International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).1 With the
welcomed departures of the Bush administration and election of President Obama,
some US officials believed that the transatlantic rift would narrow and European
governments would become more receptive to calls from an American president for
them to bear a greater share of the burden in Afghanistan.2 Obama’s first request for
more troops came during the NATO summit in Strasbourg, France and Kehl,
Germany, in April 2009. His calls were met with an almost deafening silence from US
allies in Europe. Not only did some governments refuse to send more troops, some
countries, Canada and the Netherlands, reconfirmed their commitments to pull their
troops out of Afghanistan at the end of 2010. European public opinion against the war
has grown substantially since the beginning of the war. Debates over the war even led to
fall of the Dutch coalition government in February 2010. And four days later,
Secretary of Defense, Gates expressed his criticism of the US’s allies in Europe for not
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While American politicians complain that Europe is not doing enough, European
leaders argue their participation is line with what should be expected of them. One
recent study claims that Europe and the USA are sharing the burden of the war in
Afghanistan relatively equally (Sperling and Webber 2009). But these conclusions are
based only on a static analysis without any benchmarks that set the standard for
comparison. Those benchmarks are of at least three types: burden-sharing in past
NATO missions, relative burden-sharing compared to the resources available, and
finally, burden-sharing relative to what is needed to create peace and stability in
Afghanistan.
This article unpacks that assumption by evaluating Europe’s share of the burden
in the war in Afghanistan along two dimensions  compellence and prevention or
assurance policies  and the problems of collective action associated with them.
These policies are different paths to the same goal of generating security. This
provides us with a framework to assess relative burden-sharing and what types of
collective action behavior can be expected according to each policy method. After
comparing relative burden-sharing to past NATO missions, I then turn to current
participation in the war in Afghanistan. Through rigorous quantitative analysis,
I show that larger countries are over-contributing in terms of prevention and
assurance policies, but there appears to be comparatively less free-riding taking place
regarding compellence strategies than expected. Thus, there is little evidence to
support the view that Europeans are not bearing their share of the burden.
Perceptions of uneven burden-sharing in Afghanistan are also affecting debates
over the nature and future of the North Atlantic alliance (Ian 2010). Richard Rupp
and others argue that disputes over NATO Europe’s unwillingness or inability to
contribute more to the war have revealed or exacerbated tensions within the Alliance
(Puchala 2005, Rupp 2006, Cimbala and Forster 2010). This fosters the perception
of what Defense Secretary Robert Gates called a ‘two-tiered alliance’, whereby
some NATO members are both willing and able to carry out military interventions
more than others. In contrast, Yost (2010) argues that current contributions are
commensurate with their capabilities, but does not acknowledge that they fall far
short of what is required in a combat theater like Afghanistan. This article
contributes to the debate over the future of NATO alliance by providing a firm
empirical basis for claims of uneven or equal burden-sharing. Doing so enables us to
make more credible arguments about existing tensions within NATO and, thus, its
own future as one of the long-lasting and most successful alliances in world history.
2. Burden-sharing within NATO: past as present?
Criticisms of the US’s European allies failure to bear their share of the burden of
military combat in Afghanistan abound in the contemporary media (see for example,
Rubin 2008, comments by officials in David 2009). But debate over whether Europe
is bearing its fair share of the security burden is not a recent phenomenon.
Throughout the history of the alliance, American Governments of different political
parties accused their European allies of not bearing their share of the defense burden.
The degree of imbalance in burden-sharing changed depending on American strategy
during the cold war.3 Early in the alliance’s history, NATO’s primary purpose was to
deter the Soviet Union through mutually assured destruction, a pure public good. So
long as the USA would credibly respond to a Soviet nuclear attack with its own
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nuclear arsenal, little reason existed for European countries to increase the sizes of
their militaries or levels of military spending. However, when the US military
changed its strategy to one of flexible response in the 1970s, which included the
tactical use of nuclear weapons along with conventional forces to respond to a Soviet
offensive, a NATO member not contributing to the effort could rationally fear that
the probability of a Soviet attack would increase on its territory if it was the weakest
link on the defense chain. As a result, some European countries increased their
defense spending and reduced, but did not eliminate, the disproportionate burden the
USA played in producing European security (Sandler and Hartley 1999). But as long
as the collective good was being produced, deterrence of the Soviet Union, there was
little incentive for other European countries to contribute more to NATO. One can
also argue that the collective good was optimally provided. It mattered little whether
European countries decided to contribute more or not, although in some cases they
did, such as France’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons.
2.1. Post-cold war burden-sharing
With the end of the cold war, NATO’s institutional mission changed once again, but
to providing security responses to very different types of threats. The threats that
NATO faces are no longer primarily related to defending its members’ territory from
a conventional military attack. These new security threats now include those related
to the spillover effects of state failure and/or civil war, such as environmental
degradation, flows of refugees seeking political or economic asylum. Some countries
may experience these effects more than others. For example, Italy and Spain as well
as France face larger influxes of economic refugees than Luxembourg and Norway.
Germany, along with non-NATO members Austria and Switzerland, faced large
numbers of refugees from the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. But if one member, namely
the USA, is able to provide politically or physically sufficient levels of security for the
rest of NATO’s members in response to these new types of threats, then other
members can free ride and will provide little additional assistance. Therefore, we
should expect even more free-riding than in the past.
In both the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts, problems of burden-sharing became
more acute. Deep divisions between the USA and Europe over whether and how to
intervene in Bosnia led Europeans to take the lead under the auspices of United
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). But problems of a lack of capacity,
willingness and indecisiveness among European governments eventually led Amer-
ican forces to intervene and establish a fragile peace settlement. After the Dayton
Accords were signed, NATO created Implementation Force (IFOR) and later
Stabilization Force (SFOR) to maintain the peace in Bosnia, which lasted from
December 1996 to December 2004 and involved as many as 54,000 troops at its apex.
The US troop presence ranged from 19,000 at its height, or 33 per cent of total
forces, to 7500 under SFOR by 2004. The remaining troops for SFOR came from
both NATO and non-NATO ally countries, led by the usual suspects of the UK,
France, Germany and Italy. The US Government also spent close to $12 billion
between 1992 and 2001 in a war that cost the international community an estimated
$60 billion, or 20 per cent of the total with the rest distributed among international
institutions and national governments (see Bowman 2001). After 2004, the European
Union (EU) took over responsibility for peacekeeping in Bosnia through the newly
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created EU Force (EUFOR), known as Operation Althea, one of the EU’s first
military/police missions operating under the EU’s restrengthened European Security
and Defense Policy and one of the first solely European missions without direct
NATO involvement but whose assets are borrowed.
In the case of Kosovo, there was less political disagreement over the purpose
and necessity to the mission behind Operation Allied Force, but American military
dominance was illustrated again.4 During Operation Allied Force in Kosovo,
NATO ally forces relied on the USA’s technological superiority in terms of offensive
electronic warfare tools, airborne command and control systems, all-weather
precision munitions, air-to-air refueling and mobile target acquisition (Yost 2001).
The USA assumed almost 75 per cent of the total war cost, approximately
$5 billion, not including humanitarian assistance (Ek 2000). At its height,
peacekeeping forces in Kosovo, or Kosovo Force (KFOR), included 7000 American
troops, third after the UK (19,000) and Germany (8500), of a total number of
approximately 50,000 troops (Available from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
topics_48818.htm [Accessed 21 June 2009]). But now, American troops are only
about 10 per cent (1483) of the 14,000 remaining troops stationed in Kosovo under
KFOR today, mainly because they were redeployed to Afghanistan and Iraq. EU
and other NATO countries now assume a greater share of the responsibility for
maintaining the peace.
The wars in Bosnia and Kosovo offer two different visions of burden-sharing
within the alliance. The Bosnian war clearly demonstrated the continued reliance
Europe had on the USA both to exercise military force and maintain the peace
afterwards. In contrast, it appears burden-sharing was more equal during the Kosovo
War. Whether because Europeans were unified around a single purpose or had
learned some lessons from the war in Bosnia, Europeans bore more of the burden
related to peacekeeping and stabilization operations. However, the pattern repeated
itself in that the USA assumed most of the responsibility related to the military
combat portion of the mission, while the Europeans would follow with stabilization
and reconstruction forces. How do these past missions compare with Afghanistan?
2.2. Burden-sharing in Afghanistan
The war in Afghanistan began with the invocation of Article 5 of the Atlantic
Charter, declaring the attacks on the USA on 9/11 were an attack on all. It was
followed by the US-led invasion of Afghanistan to destroy al-Qaeda strongholds and
remove the Taliban from power in October 2001 under Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF). The European contribution to the actual combat theater was minimal and
primarily included British forces in the form of air assistance. Because the initial
stages of the campaign involved almost exclusively the use of Special Forces and air
power, technological and other capacity issues limited the role European forces could
play. President Bush and the Department of Defense also wanted to avoid the
possibility that other national governments would veto or otherwise constrain US
operations. The bulk of European support for OEF came in the form of Operation
Active Endeavor (OEA), which sent Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STA-
NAVFORMED) to the Ionian Sea, providing communications and monitoring of
the area to assist countries participating in the Afghan conflict.5 It also included
sending Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) to fly over the USA,
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replacing those sent to the conflict zone. OEA was the first out-of-area NATO
mission that fell under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, but NATO forces were a minor
contribution to OEF in terms of combat forces. Most support came in the form of
replacing US military assets elsewhere rather than augmenting them in the battle
zone. Sperling and Webber (2009) consider the contributions by Canada, France,
Germany, Italy and the UK as ‘significant’ to combat operations on the ground, and
they ‘devoted an impressive share of national naval and air assets to defeat the
Taliban’ (Sperling and Webber 2009, p. 501). Yet, how do we know this and by what
measure?
First, NATO Europe’s participation in the early years of the war was hardly
significant in terms of actually producing success, which was the overthrow of the
Taliban regime. Rather, it was mainly the combination of American Special Forces,
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Afghan warlords that constituted the
Northern Alliance that led to quick removal of the Taliban from power (Rashid
2008, Jones 2009). Second, the US administration generally did not perceive any
additional military assistance that the Europeans could provide as either necessary or
would only be marginally helpful. The lessons of Kosovo, as the Bush administration
learned them, and the administration’s strong skepticism of the usefulness of
consulting allies before making important policy decisions meant little was asked
from Europe. Fears that national capitals or the NATO Council would have to be
consulted before attacking each target, as well as a shortage of real capabilities, led
the Bush administration to preemptively exclude Europeans from most of the actual
military combat in the early years of the war. Thus, Europe’s contribution to the war
at this point can only be considered fair or proportionate in light of how little was
requested or needed.
The relative burden borne by Europe’s military started to change with the
creation of ISAF. In early 2002 NATO forces started sending their own national
forces to fight alongside and support American forces, including a German and
Dutch battalion. Between 2003 and 2004, NATO member governments decided
collectively to send their forces outside Kabul and begin securing the entire country.
Almost 5000 additional NATO troops were sent to the Afghan theater. Over time, as
more areas of the country came under NATO control, European governments sent
additional soldiers and support staff. They assumed command of three Regional
Commands, with the Germans in the north, Italians in the west, French forces
controlling the Regional Command center in Kabul, and a rotating command in the
south that included British and Dutch forces.6 They led Provisional Reconstruction
Teams (PRTs), consisting of a combat troops, development officials and even
national non-government officials.7 While the original purpose of ISAF forces was
for peacekeeping, the deteriorating security situation in practically all parts of
Afghanistan led to increasingly more combat missions falling under the Regional
Commands’ tasks. ISAF’s mission had clearly expanded beyond providing security
for Kabul and the surrounding areas to include conducting stability and security
operations, aiding in justice and security reform, supporting the Afghan National
Army (ANA) and police forces, and disarming illegally armed groups, in addition to
security and reconstruction assistance fighting terrorism, poppy production and the
opium trade and organized crime.8
In response to these expanded goals, more NATO European forces began
arriving in 2003 and 2004. As of March 2010 the number of troops in Afghanistan
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numbered approximately 90,000, of which a little less than half are NATO forces.9
Seven European countries represent close to 75 per cent of all European and non-US
troops in Afghanistan.10 The largest shares come from the UK (9500), Germany
(4335), France (3750), Italy (3160), Poland (2140), the Netherlands (1880) and Spain
(1075). The remaining contributions are usually far less than 1000, ranging from a
high of 970 from Rumania to three from Austria. Aside from Australia and Canada,
these European countries together represent the greatest portion of the total non-US
troop presence in Afghanistan. Most of these countries’ military missions were
extended, with the exception of the Netherlands, which restated its commitment to
withdraw all of its forces by 2010 (Nicholas 2003).11
Sperling and Webber (2009, p. 505) conclude from these numbers that Europe is
bearing more than its fair share if compared to each country’s Gross National
Income (GNI). Additional evidence seems to provide additional support for this
claim. Figure 1 shows that a country’s ISAF contribution is roughly in line with the
size of its military, measured in terms of men and women under arms and military
spending. The UK has contributed far more than the European average, as are most
other NATO members, than predicted by the size of their militaries. Other European
countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, along with Canada, contribute
slightly more than the average predicted by their levels of military spending. Only
Turkey’s contribution is small compared to how much it spends on its military, which
is far outside the European average.
Europe’s contribution to the stabilization and rebuilding of Afghanistan does not
end with military participation. NATO members as well as the EU devoted significant
amounts of financial aid for nation-building. From 2002 to March 2009, NATO
countries disbursed $28 billion in official development assistance, of which the
USA’s portion is 82 per cent.12 All other NATO Member States have disbursed
approximately 14 per cent of the total. With the exceptions of Albania, Bulgaria,
Figure 1. ISAF troops vs. military size.
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Croatia, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Iceland, all NATO countries have
contributed some development assistance, but only Germany, Canada, the UK and
the USA have pledged more than $1 billion since the conflict began, excluding the EU.
At the same time, the EU is the largest contributor to the Law and Order Trust Fund
for Afghanistan (LOFTA) at an amount of approximately $250 million to support the
establishment and professionalization of the Afghan National Police (ANP), but is
well behind the USA in donations to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
(Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, Annual Budget, 20012009). These raw numbers
demonstrably show the USA is bearing a substantial and disproportionate burden of
nation-building in Afghanistan.
An alternative way of measuring NATO’s contribution, however, is by comparing
the relative priority European countries give Afghanistan compared to other
countries. Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries on the planet, and foreign
assistance is likely to have the greatest marginal effect, especially given its post-
conflict status (Collier 2007). EU Member States and the EU itself have helped other
post-conflict zones, such as BosniaHerzegovina and Kosovo with approximately
t150 million and t260 million, respectively (Korski 2009), but compared to the size
and relative poverty of Afghanistan, Europeans have been far more generous to
Kosovo and Bosnia (see also Jones 2009, p. 122). Europe’s focus on Bosnia and
Kosovo is clearly because they are within Europe and each is a potential EU member.
The marginal benefits of securing peace and stability in the southern Balkans are of
more importance to Europe than stability in Afghanistan. Yet, even countries outside
of Europe are receiving more aid than Afghanistan, such as Iraq and Nigeria (Korski
2009, p. 12). There are certainly historical and policy reasons why direct development
aid by European Governments are greater for some countries more than others. But,
even on a per capita basis, the USA provides almost twice as much aid to
Afghanistan ($87 per person) as the next largest donor, the UK ($44 per person).
Afghanistan is second after Iraq in receiving US development assistance and will
most likely surpass it in coming years.13
In addition, there is little evidence of any division of labor between the two sides
of the Atlantic whereby the USA and other countries engage in military combat
while others, namely ‘Old Europe’, do the peacekeeping and reconstruction of
conflict-ridden countries. However, governments may still perceive such a division of
labor exists and might be helpful given European Governments’ unwillingness to
spend more on development assistance, especially in light of the recent financial
crisis. Figure 2 compares total financial assistance NATO members have given to the
total number of troops they have within ISAF.
The amount of a country’s financial assistance to Afghanistan generally tracks
with a country’s military contribution to the conflict. Excluding the USA, the relative
combination of soft and hard power becomes clearer. France and Italy contribute
more troops than average, while Canada and the Netherlands choose to focus on aid
more than military combat when compared to the predicted mean of hard vs. soft
power, or the number of boots on the ground compared to total development
assistance. Unsurprisingly, Norway and other Scandinavian countries choose to
focus on development projects and assistance instead of exercising hard power. There
is little variation among the rest of the ISAF contributors due to such low levels of
troops and development assistance from them. The lower-left quadrant contains
European Security 467
more of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, whose main contribu-
tions consist of combat troops and little to no financial assistance.
In summary, there is some evidence to support the claim that NATO Europe is
bearing more of the security burden when compared to past missions. And it appears
that Europeans are contributing to the ISAF mission in proportion with the size of
their militaries. However, neither contributions to past missions nor static assessments
of each country’s share of ISAF participation or development assistance capture
whether each country’s contribution is in line with the benefits each country enjoys. A
country’s share of the burden is measured in terms of the costs a country must bear in
order to produce the benefits of cooperation. When a country’s efforts to produce the
good are equal to the benefits it enjoys as a result, then it is bearing its ‘fair share’. A
better way, therefore, of assessing relative burden-sharing in the war in Afghanistan is
by, first, determining what collective security good is being produced and, second,
whether a country’s efforts are in proportion to the benefits it is receiving.
3. Collective action in Afghanistan
In any alliance, when the size of its members varies in size, there is a risk of free-
riding behavior and suboptimal provision of the public good (Olson 1965, Olson and
Zechauser 1966). If the collective good is a pure public good, meaning it is non-rival
and non-excludable, then the likelihood that smaller members will free ride on the
larger ones becomes more likely. When a public good is non-rival, no member’s
consumption of the good affects another member’s consumption. When the good is
non-excludable, another member cannot be prevented from consuming it at an
affordable cost. Because the provision of security is often a pure public good, and
members have different levels of interest and capacity in its production, there are
even greater incentives to free ride. Unless mandatory contributions or other forms
Figure 2. Hard vs. soft power.
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of enforcement are in place, not only will small members free ride on larger ones.
Suboptimal levels of the public good are also produced.
During the cold war, the public good of security was deterrence of the Soviet
Union, which required mainly conventional military power and strategy. Contem-
porary national security threats and effectively responding to them can no longer be
addressed solely with the application of conventional military force or threats to use
force against states. Instead, it requires a combination of strategies, as the war in
Afghanistan shows. The politics of collective action become more complicated as a
result considering the different methods, or technologies, by which collective security
goods are produced.
According to Kirchner and Sperling (2007), governments select from four
different types of security governance policies in a post-Westphalian world. The
combination of two different functions  institution-building and conflict resolution
 with two different sets of policy instruments  persuasion or coercion  produces
a typology of four different security governance polices: prevention, assurance,
protection and compellence. The basic assumption of a prevention strategy is that
civil conflict can be avoided through economic development and effective govern-
ance, particularly through fostering nascent democratic institutions. By creating
strong states with the ability to maintain law and order, terrorist groups will not be
able to take advantage of pockets of anarchy and operate with impunity, either by
leading insurgencies against regimes in their home country or transnationally against
western governments. Ethnic groups with economic or political grievances can settle
their disputes through robust democratic institutions rather than through civil
conflict. Humanitarian and financial assistance reduces the level of human suffering,
supposedly reducing the appeal of joining militia movements seeking to overthrow
the government. The policies of prevention include financial and economic
assistance, police and army training, anti-corruption practices and general foreign
aid. These policies involve long-term state commitment through low-profile forms of
bilateral or international assistance to address security threats that may develop over
the long term.
In general, the gains achieved through prevention represent a pure public good.
No state can be excluded from them and one state’s enjoyment of them does not
decrease another’s. States do enjoy some private gains. It can enhance a government’s
prestige and influence over the receiving country (Dorussen et al. 2009). The private
gains become increasingly diluted, however, the more the policies are carried out
through international institutions rather than through national governments as who
deserves credit becomes less clear. As a result, prevention policies are highly likely
to produce problems of collective action and free-riding behavior by the smallest
members.
In contrast to prevention, a compellence security strategy relies exclusively on the
tools of military coercive force or hard power exercised against state or non-state
actors. It sometimes requires the physical separation of combatants, deterrence of
either internal or external actors that threaten a state’s internal security, and, if that
fails, the elimination of those threats through the use of military force against either
state or non-state actors. Under compellence, problems of collective action and
cooperation are endemic. First, the benefits generated are almost entirely non-rival
and non-exclusive, representing a pure public good. If an insurgent group is defeated,
state failure is prevented, and non-state security threats defeated, all countries
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benefit, depending to some extent on the kind of threat they posed. Since the goal of
compellence policies is to halt ongoing conflicts and restore order to the
international system, no one state is excluded from the benefits. Second, the costs
associated with intervening militarily and peacekeeping are highly private and cannot
easily be shared across group members. While there may be some private gains
associated with prestige and reputational gains, they are minimal compared to the
costs. Third, effective collective action is hindered by the varying military capabilities
of group members to intervene effectively. Smaller, poorer Member States that spend
comparatively less on defense are likely to free ride on the benefits produced by
larger, richer states that spend considerably more on defense. Fourth, varying levels
of interest in the public good itself can hinder collective action. If governments have
a strong preference for the provision of the collective good, they are more likely to
contribute, irrespective of the disproportionate costs of it might bear. If a state has a
relatively low preference for generating the goods associated peacekeeping and
enforcement, irrespective of the costs involved, it will contribute even less than what
weighing the marginal costs and benefits of military intervention would predict.
The two other types of security governance Kirchner and Sperling (2007) describe
are assurance and protection. Like prevention, an assurance security strategy uses
the instruments of persuasion. But, rather than long-term institution-building, this
strategy aims at conflict resolution over the short term. With assurance, states or
international institutions dedicate financial and diplomatic resources to rebuilding
societies torn by domestic strife. Instead of financial and technical assistance before
a conflict breaks out, assurance policies aim at rebuilding a society immediately after
violent conflict has ceased. Prevention policies include foreign aid, humanitarian
assistance, economic cooperation and general nation-building efforts (Leonard and
Gowan 2004). Assurance policies seek to rebuild societies after conflict and
humanitarian disasters have already occurred. An assurance security strategy is
geared toward building up the Westphalian state, rather than sustaining it. Foreign
policies include police training to restore law and order, strengthening the
enforcement of national borders, fostering reconciliation among the warring parties
by building democratic institutions and emergency humanitarian assistance to
respond to the immediate effects of internal strife.
It is often difficult to distinguish between the policies associated with prevention
and those with assurance. Policy tools such as humanitarian assistance and providing
medical care or food and water can lead to the development of state institutions as
well as rebuilding them by establishing a foundation for future institution-building.
Yet, there is an important difference between responding to international crises with
medical assistance, such as in Darfur or the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, and fostering
the construction of hospitals, schools and other facilities through policies sustained
over time. The most recent applications of these different types of security
governance strategies have been in the area of European Security and Defense
Policy and other policies the EU increasingly devotes attention to as it assumes a
greater role as a strong, independent security actor in the international system
(Kirchner and Sperling 2007, Dorussen et al. 2009).
In the case of the war in Afghanistan, both policies of prevention and assurance
are included in development and program assistance. For example, the Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust Fund includes programs related to education, judicial reform,
poverty reduction and infrastructure building, policies associated with prevention.
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LOFTA programs include the rebuilding and training of a new Afghan police force,
part of the process of generating basic levels of security in urban and rural areas.
Finally, many of these programs are carried out under the security provided by ISAF
troops. Thus, the war in Afghanistan shows that one of today’s security threats,
namely a failed state, requires the combination of security policies. Moreover, given
the expected behavior by group members is likely to be the same  extensive free-
riding with some private gains in terms of prestige and reputation  the distinction
between assurance and prevention policies from an empirical standpoint, at least in
regards to Afghanistan, is not very significant.
These policies and programs were chosen to produce some collective security
good. What that goal consists of is highly controversial, has changed over time, and
is not unanimously agreed upon. In the early years of the war, the invasion of
Afghanistan was almost an exclusively American operation aimed at capturing
Osama bin Laden and destroying al-Qaeda terrorist training camps and their ability
to plan and launch terrorist attacks. Given the Taliban would not assist in these
efforts, the mission expanded to include removing the Taliban regime from power
and replacing it with a regime friendly to the USA and its allies (Jones 2009). The
direct benefits behind the military intervention were to eliminate al-Qaeda, kill or
capture Osama bin Laden and his followers, and prevent terrorists from having a safe
haven. And it is clear from the historical record that the Bush administration argued
and anticipated that removing the Taliban from power and having a ‘light footprint’
was sufficient to achieve its security interests, as it turned its attention toward Iraq.
With the resurgence of the Taliban in 2004 and 2005, ISAF’s purpose evolved to
generating a strong central government with some authority and control over its
territory. In short, the policy goal became nation-building. Creating a stabile and
secure Afghan state will prevent refugees from flowing to the rest of Central Asia and
further destabilizing neighboring states, especially a nuclear-armed Pakistan. The
destruction of the opium fields, the primary source of European heroin, the
elimination of al-Qaeda leaders who sponsor or plan attacks on the west, would
also benefit NATO allies. Other indirect benefits include the prestige, satisfaction or
long-term gains to a state’s reputation for restoring security, protecting the rights of
women and generally improving the lives of every Afghani.
Failure in Afghanistan could also bring great harm to the USA, Europe and the
North Atlantic alliance in general. While it is true that these terrorists are primarily
interested in targeting the USA, adherents to this global jihadist vision are found not
only in the USA, and their targets are not exclusively American, such as the
bombings in Madrid in 2003 and London in 2005. In terms of private gains, the USA
wants to avoid losses to its reputation. If the USA fails to create security and stability
in Afghanistan, it could serve as a strong signal that its ability to project power and
act as a superpower by maintaining order in the international system is diminishing.
European Governments could face similar effects if the nascent Afghan state
collapses. First, they also want to avoid the security risks associated with an active al-
Qaeda network. Jihadists in Europe may no longer be receiving their training in
Afghanistan. But, if al-Qaeda and other groups were to regain strength and take hold
once again within a failed Afghan state, the threat of future terrorist attacks in
Europe would only increase. Second, if NATO experiences failure in Afghanistan, its
relevancy for solving other security problems will only decrease. In addition, NATO
Member States would lose a great deal of credibility with the US Government as
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reliable partners. Third, European countries would also face serious harm to their
reputation among both Americans and the rest of the world, further questioning
their capacity to cooperate with each other and play an important role in the
international system.
While the collective good of preventing failure in Afghanistan is great, everyone
will enjoy the benefits of success irrespective of their level of contribution. These
benefits are also non-rival and non-excludable. As a result, they will lead to the usual
problems associated with collective action and, thus, we should expect significant
free-riding to be occurring.
4. Quantitative analysis of burden-sharing
The following section assesses relative burden-sharing and exploitation along both
the compellence and prevention/assurance dimensions of security governance
through quantitative analysis. I employ two methods using both ordinal- and
interval-level data. The first method determines whether there is any statistical
relationship between a country’s ranked contribution to ISAF and its military
capacity. The second method tests alternative hypotheses for what factors best
account for why some countries contribute disproportionately more or less to the
war in Afghanistan in terms of both compellence and prevention/assurance policies.
One way of measuring fairness is by comparing the rankings of each country’s
contribution relative to their assumed military capacity. The Kendall tau test, a non-
parametric statistical test, compares the rankings of ordinal-level data. The small
number of observations does not affect the results, because it is not required to
assume the normality of the error terms. The Kendall tau statistic ranges from 1
to 1. If tau is0, then countries with a larger share of resources are contributing
more to the Afghan war effort than their ranking would predict. If tau isB0, then
small countries are contributing more than their fair share. The null hypothesis is
that there is no relationship between a country’s military or Afghan development
contribution to ISAF and its share of the burden within NATO. Exploitation of the
large by the small indicates extensive free-riding, as predicted by each security
technology.
The ranking of a country’s ISAF contribution is compared to its ranking in terms
of total spending on its military and the size of its military. We should expect that a
country’s ranking in terms of its share of total military spending or the size of its
military is roughly proportionate to its share of troops committed to the war in
Afghanistan (Table 1; see sources in Appendix 1).
In every year of ISAF’s control under NATO, larger countries are contributing
far more relative to their ranking among NATO members, indicating that some
exploitation of the large by the small is taking place. Excluding the USA from the
sample still produces a large, positive coefficient, which indicates that dispropor-
tionate contributions to the war in Afghanistan, relative to a country’s ranking
within the NATO alliance, is occurring even when the USA is absent from the
sample. In the case of prevention policies, ranked-order correlation analysis is also
conducted, whereby the rank of a NATO member’s total aid to Afghanistan is
compared to its rank within NATO in terms of wealth and economic size (Table 2).
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We observe the same tendencies in that a country’s level of development assistant
far outpaces its relative size or wealth, which also indicates some exploitation of the
large by the small occurs in terms of prevention/assurance policies.
However, there are some important limitations to this type of analysis. First, the
analysis only shows that there is incongruity between current levels of active troops
and military spending, whereby larger states are over-contributing, and not
necessarily whether actual free-riding is occurring. It remains unclear whether this
relationship is substantively significant or only reflects the data’s structure. Also,
correlation analysis cannot capture the extent there is free-riding or what its primary




A second method attempts to account for which factors explain why a country is
over- or under-contributing to the mission in Afghanistan. The results of multiple
Table 1. Compellence and burden-sharing.
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*Significant at 0.05.
Note: Kau, a scores; p, scores in parentheses.
Table 2. Burden-sharing for prevention/assurance policies.
Aid to Afghanistan/GDP
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*Significant at 0.05.
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regression analysis below utilize panel data on country contributions over time.
Fairness can also be measured in terms of a country’s share of the costs it is willing to
bear (CONTRIBUTIONi /CONTRIBUTIONi ISAF) to its share of the benefits. In
the case of compellence, the costs include a country’s contribution to ISAF. This
measure is not without limitations, because it does not take into account a whole
host of other factors that constitute a country’s contribution to the war in
Afghanistan. First, the number of boots on the ground does not capture entirely
all of the equipment, aerial, naval and other military support given by a NATO ally.
Second, it does include the redeployment of military forces out of Afghanistan in
support of the mission, such as Operation Althea. Third, it does not take into
account the number of civilians, especially national police forces, sent to Afghanistan
to train and equip the ANP force or to lead development and reconstruction
projects, which are also related to compellence tactics. Fourth, this measure does not
take into the qualifications or caveats NATO members place on their forces in terms
of the activities they are permitted to engage in, inhibiting their utility in battle and
lowering the value of their contribution. Nevertheless, all of these additional
elements missing from the analysis are assumed to be commensurate with a country’s
participation in ISAF.
Quantifying the benefits for a country participating in the production of the
collective security good, namely victory in the war in Afghanistan, is far more
difficult to estimate. The purpose of the conflict has widened in scope from
elimination and removal of al-Qaeda forces from Afghanistan to removal of the
Taliban from power, installation of a democratically elected government with
effective control over its territory and borders, as well as reducing its exports of
opium. As a result, the benefits include reducing the chance of future terrorist attacks
on NATO soil, generating stability in a volatile region in the world, reducing the
criminality and other effects of the international drug trade on domestic populations.
Even the case of one specific benefit, reducing the probability of a terrorist attack, is
difficult to estimate. It is hard to capture the number of lives saved, economic gains
when airport security measures are relaxed and property losses avoided.14
To capture the security gains association with compellence, Dorussen et al. (2009)
use a country’s GNI, which measures the total economic productivity of the
economy, as an indicator for the benefits related to active use of hard military power.
Although GNI does not directly capture the gains of avoiding a terrorist attack or the
other suspected security benefits related to the war in Afghanistan, a country’s total
economic productivity is a good approximate measure of the aggregate effects of
reducing national security risks. The dependent variable, therefore, is share of one
country’s contribution, troops on the ground, as a share of the benefits it enjoys as a
member. In the case of prevention, the benefits are measured as gains to a country’s


















The log-transformation corrects for the issue that countries receiving a small share of
the benefits are likely to contribute dramatically. A positive coefficient indicates
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that countries whose shares of the benefits are greater than others are contribu-
ting disproportionately to the production of the collective good in relation to a
particular factor. A negative coefficient indicates that they are contributing
disproportionately less.
4.1.2. Independent variables
The following variables assess which factors best account for why a country
contributes disproportionately less or more than predicted by the benefits it enjoys
from the war in Afghanistan. The set of variables capture the relative capacity of a
country to contribute to the war in Afghanistan. As the size of a country’s economy,
its wealth, population as well as military power increases, it should be contributing
more compared to the benefits it is enjoying. A dummy variable for a new NATO
Member State is included, which is expected to over-contribute compared to the
benefits it enjoys in order to demonstrate its fidelity to the organization. Dummy
variables for the USA, because it is the largest contributor to ISAF, and a dummy
variable for being a European country are introduced to assess whether these
countries de facto are under-contributing. A dummy variable for Turkey is used to
take into account its large military compared to the size of its economy and for
Luxembourg because of its great wealth compared to the size of its military. Because
the military commitment to Afghanistan began in 2001 with OEF and is still a small
component of the total military effort there, two different models are used to
estimate what factors are associated with different levels of burden-sharing. The
variables employed, their precise measurement, predicted direction and sources are
listed in Appendix 1. Observations are organized into panel data and results are
reported with panel-correct standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995, Beck et al. 1998).
4.2. Results
Statistical results for both compellence and prevention/assurance strategies are
presented in Table 3. When considering compellence strategies related to ISAF only,
wealthier countries are over-contributing compared to the benefits they enjoy. The
marginal effect is relatively large, which reflects the capacity of richer countries to
pay for military intervention and its lower marginal costs. In contrast to the Kendall-
rank test, military size or spending does not predict over-contributing. The results
also show that the USA is under-contributing compared to the benefits it enjoys.
This could be a function of the USA’s comparatively large economy, producing a
large denominator, and, thus, is a highly influential observation. Turkey appearing to
be over-contributing mirrors that finding, which could be a function of its very large
army compared to the size of its economy.
However, the war in Afghanistan was and is not limited to military participation
in ISAF. OEF was the chief form in which military intervention took place and
involved mainly American and British forces. In comparison, before 2003, ISAF was
geographically limited to Kabul, had no direct mandate to engage in combat
activities, and involved mainly Turkish soldiers and no official NATO presence.
In this scenario, only whether a country is a NATO member since 1999 is statistically
significant, showing that they are bearing a significantly disproportionate share
of the burden since the Afghan conflict began. Unsurprisingly, Luxembourg is
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under-contributing compared to its high wealth. Turkey’s contribution remains
disproportionately large, which may indicate that its disproportionate contribution is
also a result of early involvement in Afghanistan.
In considering prevention/assurance policies, we observe that size, wealth and
population have a significant effect on the shape of burden-sharing. Larger and
wealthier countries are over-contributing to Afghan development compared to the
benefits generated. But countries with larger populations are also under-contributing,
which indicates that some small European countries, such as Sweden and Norway,
are compensating for their inability to contribute more militarily by increasing their
share of total development and peacekeeping assistance. There also does not appear
to be any division of labor between Europe and the USA in terms of the use of soft
or hard power when including total military capacity.
One difficulty with interpreting these results is the difficulty in finding an
appropriate indicator for the benefits states enjoy by invading and building up the
Afghan state. Even when assuming that primary gains associated with a successful
military campaign is the prevention of another terrorist attack on a NATO member
country, measuring the costs of a terrorist attack and expenses related to counter-
terrorism efforts in general is extremely problematic (Sandler and Enders 2008,
Treverton et al. 2008). These problems are further exacerbated by divisions over the








(hard vs. soft power)
Size (GDP, share) 23.024* (9.924) 30.129 (18.076) 10.299** (3.425) 10.331** (3.975)
Wealth (GDP per
capita, share)
1.735 (10.630) 11.507 (8.165) 10.864*** (2.981) 13.882*** (3.286)
Population (share) 12.576 (9.523) 0.737 (8.971) 12.965*** (3.205) 12.114*** (3.493)
GNI (share) 9.586 (6.310) 10.035 (5.667) 1.819 (1.051) 1.226 (1.883)
Military spending
(share)
2.180 (4.855) 7.411 (7.623) 0.444 (2.527)
NATO troops
(share)
1.028 (7.379) 8.505 (9.535) 1.541 (1.544)
New NATO member 0.341 (0.345) 0.798*** (0.241) 0.092 (0.052) 0.094 (0.066)
Europe 0.354 (0.347) 0.074 (0.200) 0.055 (0.087) 0.019 (0.077)
USA 4.967* (1.957) 2.018 (1.605) 1.828** (0.605) 1.620 (0.852)
LX 0.404 (0.396) 1.276** (0.437) 0.862*** (0.132) 1.142*** (0.204)
TK 1.266** (0.437) 1.749* (0.769) 1.076*** (0.175) 1.241*** (0.203)




Prevention (lag) 0.497*** (0.061) 0.446*** (0.058)
Constant 1.004 (0.519) 0.391 (0.338) 0.075 (0.105) 0.176 (0.116)
R2 0.548 0.582 0.917 0.931
N 133 135 195 187
x2 3158.49 43.36 12000.33 17171.79
*Significant at 0.10 level; **significant at 0.05 level; ***significant at 0.01 level.
Note: Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses; models include corrections for panel-specific
autocorrelation (AR1).
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purpose of the Afghan war and whether the policies in place will succeed in achieving
those goals, which is, minimally, a state strong enough to control its territory and
borders. Finally, even if this is the primary objective and burden-sharing is relatively
even, serious doubts can be raised whether there are enough resources, both military
and financial, to accomplish that goal.
5. Summary and the surge
The best way to assess relative burden-sharing in the war in Afghanistan within the
NATO alliance is by using the proper benchmarks for comparison. Compared to
past out-of-area missions and static distributions of state military and financial
resources, it appears that Europe is contributing at least its fair share, even when
compared to their capabilities. But, when comparing European participation in the
war and the development of Afghanistan to the benefits and costs of doing so, we
observe some free-riding by older NATO members in terms of the military conflict,
even when controlling for the US presence. In terms of prevention or assurance
policies, wealthier, larger Member States are over-contributing relative to the
benefits. Yet, the picture changes slightly over time and when comparing among
NATO Europe countries only. Even in the light of powerful incentives to free ride,
NATO Europe is contributing is fair share, if not more so.
However, analysis of relative burden-sharing is irrelevant if there are not
sufficient resources for achieving success in Afghanistan. The sheer cost and
difficulty in establishing a state that has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force
over a territory as large and with a society as complex as Afghanistan’s is on a scale
NATO has not experienced in the past nor fully estimated during the early years of
the war. Afghanistan is one the poorest countries in the world, does not have a long
history of stable and effective central government and is divided along multiple
ethnic and linguistic lines. The problems Afghanistan faces establishing internal
security, controlling its borders, combating the international narcotics trade,
corruption and establishing effective governing institutions are well-documented
(see among many others, Jones 2006).
While the quantitative analysis shows that there is little uneven burden-sharing, the
USA is bearing most of burden related to the latest surge of troops and resources. By
the end of 2008, the number of Afghan National Army (ANA) troops numbered 79,000
and there were 75,000 members of the Afghan National Police (ANP), not nearly
sufficient to provide security for a country as large as Afghanistan.15 In July 2008, the
Department of Defense issued a comprehensive review of the US Government’s
strategy and found that US Embedded Training Teams, responsible for training the
ANA, needed 1000 more trainers. The strategic review also reported that only 886
personnel of 2375 needed civilian trainers were stationed in Afghanistan. Over the next
2 years, President Obama’s new strategy intends to increase the Afghan National Army
(ANA) to 134,000 members and the Afghan National Polize (ANA) to 82,000 over 2
years, together with 30,000 more soldiers. He will also send 4000 more military and
police trainers and, in an effort to build up Afghanistan’s governing institutions, 3000
civilian trainers. In turn, European Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) is sending
800 more trainers and Germany is sending 41 more. Altogether, 3000 more non-US
troops were sent to Afghanistan in 2009, mainly to provide security during
Afghanistan’s presidential elections. Although welcomed, NATO Europe’s share of
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the burden is not increasing in proportion to the level of its current participation. On
the contrary, it is decreasing. In addition, development assistance for Afghanistan is
not nearly on par with what it should be, while European countries are still giving
priority to other countries.
If successful, the Afghan surge would amount to 1000 troops and 250 police per
100,000 inhabitants, which, according to Dobbins et al. (2003), meets the required
threshold for a successful occupation. Yet, reaching this goal by fall of 2011 is highly
unlikely. Even if the recent ‘surge’ takes place, the long-term viability of this new
counter-insurgency strategy is highly contested.16 Nevertheless, the probability of
success increases somewhat if more troops are sent now, unless success is once again
redefined as the status quo  a corrupt, but stabile Afghan Government and defeated
insurgency. Then, US troops will withdraw, victory will be declared and disputes over
burden-sharing will emerge again during future NATO military missions. Until the
standard for success is lowered, the public good of a strong, Afghan state that
controls its borders and territory is not being provided at an optimal level given the
improbable benefits its produces.
Although there has been significant criticism in the media and other circles of
Europeans’ reluctance to send more troops, it is not even clear that the Obama
administration necessarily wants more troops from Europe unless national caveats
on the use of force are relaxed.17 The national caveats governments put on their
military forces, such as issues related to ineffective command and control and
the lack of successful cooperation between civilian trainers, military leaders and the
Afghan Government in a variety of situations are not addressed here. This article
focuses on quantity rather than quality. While national caveats are an important part
of American criticisms of European ISAF forces, the production of the public good,
a stabile centralized government with control over its territory and borders, will
require more as well as better military forces from Europe. Controlling for national
caveats, I assume that more troops and resources from NATO Europe will be more
than marginally beneficial and that lifting national caveats alone on European forces
will not increase the probability of success. Thus, although President Obama’s ‘New
Strategy’ will attempt to address all the shortcomings of the previous administra-
tion’s strategy, namely an insufficient number of troops and a poor strategic plan,
it appears that America’s allies in Europe will not provide significant amounts of
assistance along the way.
Left to be explained is why the size of a country’s military contribution as well as
amount of financial assistance still varies across NATO Europe and over time.
Although every NATO member ally has a dominant strategy to free ride, some
countries contribute less or more than predicted by the size of their military or
amount of military spending. The benefits related to the war in Afghanistan are also
partly the result of differing perceptions both national populations and governments
have about the war in Afghanistan and the costs of failure. Thus, there is a significant
role for public opinion to play, as well as the perceptions of national governments, in
relation to the possible threats associated with failure in Afghanistan. Other factors
besides rational self-interest may also be at play. Traditional security cultures or
contrasting threat perceptions may explain why contributions to the war in
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Afghanistan vary within NATO Europe. There is still a large amount of variation
that requires explanation, which is the task of future research.
Notes
1. At the London Conference on Afghanistan, many countries announced additional
military and financial contributions, some of which were first declared at the NATO
summit in 2009. Most additional troops would come from new NATO allies, such as
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia, while Germany and Spain their troop contribution
mainly for the upcoming national elections (available from: http://afghanistan.hmg.
gov.uk/en/conference/contributions/# [Accessed 31 May 2010]).
2. For arguments concerning continuity or division within the North Atlantic alliance
(see the contributions in Anderson et al. 2008).
3. Sandler and Hartley (1999) contain an extensive bibliography regarding burden-sharing in
NATO.
4. In terms of domestic politics, the Kosovo war did lead to fierce debates within Germany’s
Green party, then a member of the governing coalition, over the legality of the mission
and the use of German troops offensively.
5. Since its first deployment in 2001, the North Atlantic Council expanded the mission of
Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) in terms of purpose and membership. Its task now is to
monitor the entire Mediterranean for movements of terrorist groups and illegal weapons
shipments and includes several non-NATO countries, namely Russia and the Ukraine.
As a result, OAE has become one of the central components of NATO’s counterterrorism
strategy (available from: http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/rtt/html_en/rtt04.html [Ac-
cessed 31 May 2010]).
6. Because of continued, intense fighting in the east along the border with Pakistan, the USA
remained in charge of Regional Command-East.
7. The make-up of the Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) varies considerably across
them as well as levels of coordination within them, which some attribute as one key reason
for the lack of success in Afghanistan to date.
8. See the numerous accords and declarations by NATO and participating countries at
multiple International Afghanistan conferences cataloged by Sperling and Webber (2009,
pp. 501502).
9. Calculation of the total European contribution includes both NATO and non-NATO
members, including Turkey (available from: http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/
Placemats/20100303%20Placemat.pdf [Accessed 31 May 2010]).
10. Non-NATO countries also made significant troop contribution. By March 2010, they
included Australia (1550), New Zealand (220) and the former Yugoslav republic of
Macedonia (165).
11. Switzerland also removed the last two of 31 troops of military mission in 2008 that was
sent to Afghanistan in 2003 (available from: http://www.swissinfo.ch: February 23, 2008
[Accessed 31 May 2010]). Although Serbia promised to send 1000 troops in 2003, the offer
was rescinded after parliamentary elections.
12. Source: Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, Donor Financial Review. Of the total amount
of financial assistance from all sources, including the EU and other international
institutions, the US portion falls to 66 per cent. Using pledged amounts, which stretch
to 2013, the US portion is 61 per cent, while other NATO countries’ share amount to 15
per cent, excluding the EU and other international institutions.
13. Source OECD. Available from: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCodeODA_
DONOR. The OECD separates only Official Development Assistance as specified by
reporting agencies and does not include the supplemental US bilateral aid to Afghanistan.
14. In some innovative analysis (see Enders and Sandler 1991, 1996).
15. Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress, January 2009.
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16. For a sustained critique of the new counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan (see
Johnson and Mason 2009).
17. Statement of US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, before the House Armed Services
Committee, 10 September 2008.
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